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I
n their thoughtful criticism of the conclusion by a 
joint panel of the Canadian Institutes of Health Re-
search  and  the  Multiple  Sclerosis  (MS)  Society  of 
Canada concerning Dr. Paolo Zamboni’s “liberation pro-
cedure”  for  chronic  cerebrospinal  venous  insufficiency 
(CCSVI), Dr. Andreas Laupacis and Dr. Arthur Slutsky 
missed an important public policy point: there is an addi-
tional, little-developed freedom involved in patient au-
tonomy in Canadian law, which is the other face of the 
coin of informed consent. Note that I speak of a coin of 
freedom, not of right. If there is a right, someone is under 
a duty, and there is no duty on anyone to conduct stud-
ies of the liberation procedure. The court would reject a 
claim for an order against researchers or institutions that 
such a study be done. The correlative of a freedom—the 
classic example is the freedom to walk in a public park—is 
that no one has the right to object. The legal philosophers 
call this a “no-right” to distinguish it from a duty. In the 
case we are considering, no researcher has the legal right 
to omit obtaining informed consent when signing up sub-
jects (indeed, this side of the coin is now treated as a duty 
of disclosure when the researcher is embarked on a study 
and is recruiting subjects); similarly, for the obverse of 
the freedom coin in question, for patients satisfying the 
requirements for enrolment in a study of the liberation 
procedure, no researcher has the right to refuse those 
who choose to participate, as argued below. 
Laupacis and Slutsky summarized the panel’s deci-
sion  as  follows:  “the  evidence  linking  CCSVI  and  MS 
was so unconvincing that it would be inappropriate at 
this time to perform a clinical trial examining the bene-
fits and risks of endovascular treatment as a therapy for 
MS.” Risk/benefit is an incomplete ratio: also relevant 
is risk/knowledge. Health Canada advises researchers 
developing informed consent documents not to mention 
that a research ethics committee has approved the re-
search because “approval means only that the Commit-
tee considers the risks to fall within a scale of risks which 
a reasonable participant may be invited to accept, and 
that the risk-to-benefit (or risk-to-knowledge) ratio of 
the study appears favourable.”1 [Emphasis added.] 
Where is the fair-minded risk-to-knowledge analysis 
in the panel’s deliberations or its conclusion? A patient 
has a right to determine what shall be done to his or her 
body, as well as what shall not be done to it. 
The freedom I claim is implied in an extract of the 
decision by Justice Sydney Robins in an Ontario Court 
of Appeal case, Fleming v Reid,2 quoted in a publication 
of the Canadian Medical Protective Association.3 There, 
Justice Robins said:
The right to determine what shall, or shall not, be done with 
one’s own body, and to be free from non-consensual med-
ical treatment, is a right deeply rooted in our common law. 
This right underlines the doctrine of informed consent. With 
very limited exceptions, every person’s body is considered 
inviolate, and, accordingly, every competent adult has the 
right to be free from unwanted medical treatment. The fact 
that serious risks or consequences may result from a refusal 
of medical treatment does not vitiate the right of medical 
self-determination. The doctrine of informed consent en-
sures  the  freedom  of  individuals  to  make  choices  about 
their medical care. It is the patient, not the physician, who 
ultimately must decide if treatment—any treatment—is to 
be administered. [Emphasis added.]
The headnote to the Fleming v Reid case report2 ex-
plains the issues and decision in the case and helps eluci-
date the freedom that I assert exists: 
Criminal Law — Detention and release after trial — Custody 
of insane persons — Powers of Lieutenant Governor.
Compulsory treatment of involuntary patients — Patients, 
when  competent,  expressing  wish  not  to  receive  treat-
ment — Treatment offending Charter — Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 — Mental Health Act, R.S.O 
1980, c. 262, ss. 35(2)(b)(ii), 35a.
S.  35a  and  s.  35(2)(b)(ii)  of  the  Act  are  inconsistent  with   
s. 7 of the Charter to the extent that they empower the 
review board to authorize the psychiatric treatment of an 
involuntary incompetent patient contrary to the patient’s 
competent refusal to accept such treatment as expressed through the patient’s substitute consent giver. These sec-
tions are not saved by s. 1 of the Charter. The sections deny 
the patient any hearing in which they may assert their com-
petent wishes through their substitute. The hearing provid-
ed by the sections turns on the question of the patient’s best 
interests, not on why their competent wishes should not be 
honoured. This is a violation of the principles of fundamen-
tal justice that cannot be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.  [Emphasis added.]
If  Canadians  with  MS  are  given  full  information 
about the risks of the procedure, the possibility of im-
mediate benefit to the individual subject (which I grant 
is probably small, but is unquantifiable) and the likeli-
hood of gains in knowledge that will benefit all patients 
with MS, one can confidently predict that enough Can-
adian patients will altruistically accept the opportunity 
to participate in a multi-centre study to rule in or rule 
out this treatment for MS. 
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